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Abstract: The observed patterns of equity portfolio allocation around the world are at odds with predictions 
from a capital asset pricing model (CAPM). What has come to be called the “home-bias” phenomenon is that 
investors tend to hold a disproportionately large share of their equity portfolio in home country stocks as 
compared with predictions of the CAPM. This paper provides an explanation of the home-bias phenomenon 
based on information-gap decision theory. The decision concept that is used here is that profit is satisficed and 
robustness to uncertainty is maximized rather than expected profit being maximized. Furthermore, uncertainty 
is modeled nonprobabilistically with info-gap models of uncertainty, which can be viewed as a possible 
quantification of Knightian uncertainty. 
 
JEL classification: D81, F30, G11, G15 
 
Key words: equity home bias, Knightian uncertainty 1 Introduction
The observed patterns of equity portfolio allocation around the world are at odds with pre-
dictions from the Capital Asset Price Models (CAPM) of Sharpe [16] and Lintner [13]. What
has come to be called the ‘home bias’ phenomenon is that investors tend to hold a dispro-
portionately large share of their equity portfolio in home country stocks, as compared with
predictions of the CAPM. This paper provides an explanation of the home bias phenomenon
based on information-gap decision theory. The decision concept which is used here is that
proﬁt is satisﬁced and robustness-to-uncertainty is maximized, rather than expected proﬁt
being maximized. Furthermore, uncertainty is modelled non-probabilistically with info-gap
models of uncertainty.
French and Poterba [6, 7] quantify the magnitude of the home bias for a number of
countries and conclude that the size of the home bias is substantial, which led to the terms
Home Bias Puzzle or French and Poterba Puzzle. For more details see Jeske [10].
In their calculations, French and Poterba assume that the investor maximizes the ex-
pected return decremented with a variance-based risk term. Let w = (wh;wf)0 represent the
vector of home and foreign investments, let e ¹ be the expected returns for home and foreign
investments, and let Σ be the covariance matrix of returns. In the French and Poterba model,
w is chosen to maximize U(w) = w0e ¹ ¡ ¸
2w0Σw where ¸ is chosen to weight the risk term.
An extremum of U(w) occurs when e ¹ = ¸Σw.
Let wo denote the observed portfolio weights for a particular country, so that the expected
returns consistent with CAPM proﬁt maximization would be e ¹o = ¸Σwo. For the same
country, let wmc denote the portfolio weights based on world market capitalization, without
any home bias eﬀect. That is, wmc
h is the fraction of the world market capitalization ascribable
to the country in question. For example, wmc
h = 0:475 for the US. Without any home bias,
one would expect that 47.5% of US investments would be in US assets. The vector of
expected returns consistent with the CAPM, based on world market capitalization without
home bias, is e ¹mc = ¸Σwmc. French and Poterba observed, for a wide range of countries,
that:
e ¹o
h > e ¹mc
h and e ¹o
f < e ¹mc
f (1)
The returns vectors e ¹o and e ¹mc are not observed market values, but rather calculated
values which are consistent with the CAPM decision model and observed portfolio weights.
If the investor’s behavior is rightly modelled by the CAPM theory, then e ¹o and e ¹mc can
be interpreted as returns vectors which are anticipated or perceived by the investor. Rela-
tions (1) imply that investors perceive the domestic assets to perform better, and the foreign
assets to perform worse, than the bias-free portfolio would indicate. French and Poterba
assess these perceptions with the following ‘shadow cost’:
s = (e ¹o














The shadow cost expresses how much an annual management fee for foreign assets must
exceed the management fee for domestic assets, in order to induce the investor away from
foreign assets, and towards domestic assets, according to the CAPM analysis. Most OECD
countries display shadow costs between 200 and 500 basis points, and the values for some
OECD countries are much higher. Annual management fees of several hundred basis points
are unrealistically high for ﬁnancial markets.
This paper evaluates whether a model in which investors act as robust satisﬁcers of proﬁt,
rather than as proﬁt maximizers, is able to account for the home bias eﬀect. In particular, we
2explore whether an info-gap robust-satisﬁcing decision rule requires lower shadow costs (than
required by the CAPM model) in order to account for the observed home bias phenomenon.
2 Robust Satisﬁcing with an Info-gap Model
In this section we formulate a robust-satisﬁcing decision function motivated by severe infor-
mation gaps facing the decision maker. Our notation is as follows.
w 2 <N is a vector of investment weight-fractions. wi is the fraction of the total budget
which is invested in stock i, and
PN
i=1 wi = 1. w is chosen by the decision maker.
¹ 2 <N is the proﬁt vector, so 1 + ¹i dollars are earned per dollar invested in stock i. ¹
is unknown when the investment is made, though the anticipated proﬁt vector e ¹ is known.
The proﬁt from investment, normalized to a unit budget, is w0¹. The anticipated rate of
proﬁt is w0e ¹.
¼c is a reservation proﬁt: the lowest acceptable value of the unknown proﬁt w0¹, per dollar
invested. For instance, ¼c = 0:02 means that 2% capital gain is necessary for ‘survival’.
Likewise, ¼c = 0 means that breaking even is adequate.
The decision maker has very limited information about the variability of the proﬁt vector
¹, and is unable to verify a probability distribution for ¹. In lieu of this, the uncertain
variation of ¹ is represented by an info-gap model, which is a family of nested sets of
¹-vectors: U(®; e ¹), ® ¸ 0. All sets contain the known, anticipated, proﬁt vector, e ¹, and
the range of variation of ¹ increases as ® grows. That is, an info-gap model of uncertainty
displays the properties of ‘nesting’ and ‘contraction’ [3]:
Nesting: ® < ®0 implies U(®; e ¹) ½ U(®0; e ¹) (3)
Contraction: U(0; e ¹) = fe ¹g (4)
Relation (3) imbues ® with its meaning as an ‘horizon of uncertainty’: the range of variability
of ¹ increases as ® grows. Combining relations (3) and (4) shows that the anticipated proﬁt
vector e ¹ is always possible, and e ¹ is the only possibility when there is no uncertainty (® = 0).
Info-gap models express very sparse knowledge about uncertainty. An info-gap model
represents uncertainty at two levels: for any positive value of ®, the speciﬁc realization of ¹
from among the possibilities in U(®; e ¹), is unknown. In addition, the horizon of uncertainty,
®, is unknown and unbounded so there is no known worst (or best) case. There is no
measure-theoretic aspect to an info-gap model: there are no density functions of probability,
plausibility, membership, etc. There are many types of info-gap models [3], and we will see
one example shortly.
Since the proﬁt vector ¹ is unknown, the decision maker cannot directly maximize the
proﬁt on investment, w0¹. Furthermore, since the probability distribution of ¹ is also un-
known, the decision maker cannot maximize the expected proﬁt. What can be attempted
is to satisﬁce the proﬁt — guarantee adequate reward — and maximize the robustness to
the information-gaps which surround ¹. This strategy of robust satisﬁcing will now be
explained, based on an info-gap model for uncertainty in the proﬁt.
The robustness of investment proﬁle w is the greatest horizon of uncertainty ® at which
no realization of the proﬁt vector ¹ causes a proﬁt w0¹ less than the aspiration ¼c:







More robustness is better than less, at the same aspiration for proﬁt ¼c, so b ®(w;¼c)
establishes a preference ranking on investments w based on satisﬁcing the proﬁt at ¼c. The
3robust-optimal investment proﬁle, b w(¼c), is an investment vector which maximizes the
robustness, at ﬁxed proﬁt aspiration ¼c:
b w(¼c) = argmax
w
b ®(w;¼c) (6)
A very important property of the robustness function is that b ®(w;¼c) decreases mono-
tonically as the aspiration ¼c increases. This expresses the inexorable trade-oﬀ between
immunity to uncertainty, and aspiration for proﬁt: large aspirations are more vulnerable
than low aspirations. This is an immediate result of the nesting of the info-gap model, and
holds for any ﬁxed investment proﬁle w. It can also be proven that this monotonic trade-oﬀ
holds for the robust-optimal proﬁle. That is, b ®( b w(¼c); ¼c) decreases as ¼c increases [2].
We note from eq.(5) that, since w and ¼c are both normalized by the budget, the robust-
ness is homogeneous to order zero in the budget: b ®(Bw;B¼c) = b ®(w;¼c) for any B 6= 0. In
other words, our unit-budget assumption will not inﬂuence the evaluation of the robustness,
or the choice of a robust-optimal investment proﬁle, so long as ¼c is interpreted as a fractional
proﬁt on the investment, relative to the total budget.
3 Robustness Function with Ellipsoid-bound Info-gap Model
We will now evaluate the robustness function for a speciﬁc choice of the info-gap model of
uncertainty in the proﬁt vector.
The analyst selects the speciﬁc form of the info-gap model as the most restrictive family
of nested sets which is consistent with the knowledge about the uncertain variability. In the
present case, the anticipated proﬁt vector e ¹ is known. In addition, data are available which
express the interdependencies between the variation of the proﬁts of diﬀerent assets. These
data are usually represented by an empirical covariance matrix Σ 2 <N£N, though we do
not know the underlying probability distribution.
With this information about the proﬁt vector, a suitable choice is the ellipsoid-bound
info-gap model, which is a family of nested ellipsoids of ¹-vectors:
U(®; e ¹) =
n
¹ = e ¹ + u : u0Σ¡1u · ®2
o
; ® ¸ 0 (7)
Σ is a known, real, symmetric, positive deﬁnite matrix which determines the shape and
orientation of the uncertainty-ellipsoids. The size of these ellipsoids is determined by ®,
which is the unknown horizon of uncertainty. This family of sets of ¹ vectors displays the
properties of nesting and contraction, eqs.(3) and (4).




w0¹ = w0e ¹ ¡ ®
p
w0Σw (8)
Referring to eq.(5), the robustness of investment w is the greatest value of ® at which this
minimum proﬁt does not fall below the critical proﬁt ¼c. If the anticipated proﬁt, w0e ¹, falls
short of the critical proﬁt ¼c, then the robustness is zero. Otherwise, equating the righthand





w0e ¹ ¡ ¼c p
w0Σw
if w0e ¹ ¸ ¼c
0 else
(9)
The robust-optimal investment vector, b w(¼c), and the maximal robustness, b ®( b w;¼c), are
derived in section 8. Explicit expressions are obtained, and it is shown that, unless all the
elements of the anticipated proﬁt vector e ¹ are the same, both b w(¼c) and b ®( b w;¼c) vary as e ¹
changes.
44 Robust-satisﬁcing Shadow Cost
In this section we derive an explicit analytical expression for the robust-satisﬁcing shadow
cost based on the info-gap robustness function for the ellipsoidal info-gap model of proﬁt-
uncertainty.
4.1 Calculating the Shadow Cost
We calculate the info-gap shadow cost in a manner analogous to the French and Poterba
method summarized in eq.(2): as the perceived advantage of the domestic equity plus the
perceived disadvantage of the foreign equity. We calculate two centerpoint proﬁt vectors:
e ¹mc is consistent with the portfolio weights corresponding to the world market capitalization,
wmc, and e ¹o is consistent with the observed portfolio weights, wo. The shadow cost is
calculated from e ¹mc and e ¹o with eq.(2), which can be expressed:
s = (1 ¡ 1)(e ¹o ¡ e ¹mc) (10)
We do this for each country and each year, using the estimated covariance matrix Σ, whose










Figure 1. Determining the centerpoint, e ¹, given portfolio weights w (two-country case).
We now formulate this more precisely. Let b ®d represent the demanded robustness, and
let ¼c denote the aspired annual proﬁt. (We will not need to choose a ¼c value in order to
calculate a shadow cost. The meaning and choice of b ®d will be discussed in section 4.2.)
Let w be the speciﬁed vector of portfolio weights (either wmc or wo). We seek a centerpoint
vector e ¹ for which w is the vector of portfolio weights which maximizes the robustness, as
in eq.(6), and for which the resulting maximal robustness equals b ®d. As we will explain in
section 6.1.1, this robust-optimal conﬁguration can be represented geometrically in ¹-space:
the ellipsoid, (¹ ¡ e ¹)0Σ¡1(¹ ¡ e ¹) = b ®2
d, is tangent to the hyperplane, w0¹ = ¼c, at the point
¹ = ¼c1. (1 is the N-vector whose elements are all ones.) This is shown schematically in
ﬁg. 1 for the 2-country case. Tangency at the point ¹ = ¼c1 requires that the gradient of
the ellipsoid is parallel to w:
¡cw = Σ¡1(¼c1 ¡ e ¹) (11)
where c is a positive constant which is chosen so that, when this value of e ¹ is used in eq.(9),
the robustness equals b ®d. After solving for c in this way one ﬁnds the centerpoint to be:




Using this equation, e ¹o is calculated with wo and e ¹mc is calculated wmc. The shadow cost is
calculated with e ¹o and e ¹mc in eq.(10). Notice that the shadow cost does not depend upon
the proﬁt aspiration, ¼c, but that it scales linearly with the demanded robustness, b ®d.
54.2 Choosing Demanded Robustness b ®d
In this section we discuss the choice of the demanded robustness b ®d to express the investor’s
aversion to, or proclivity for, risk. Our choice of b ®d is analogous to the method which French
and Poterba use to select the risk aversion coeﬃcient ¸ discussed in section 1. However, the
concepts of risk aversion are quite diﬀerent.
French and Poterba choose ¸ by assuming that an investor who is unbiased (that is, who
diversiﬁes according to market shares) uses an implicit ¹ given by:
¹mc = ¸Σwmc (13)
They pick a country, for instance the U.S., and choose ¸ so that the implicit return for that
country, ¹us, matches a target return, ¹t
us. For example, this target return would be the








In other words, French and Poterba ask: “How risk averse would an unbiased investor have
to be in order to have an implicit expected return for the U.S. equal to some observed long-
term average return ¹t
us?”. The answer is expressed in the choice of ¸. A large value of ¸
entails large aversion to risk.
We do something analogous in the choice of the demanded robustness b ®d, which expresses
how much immunity, to uncertainty in the returns, is required by the investor. We ask: “How
much robustness to long-term proﬁt-variability, b ®d, would be required by an investor.
Fig. 4 shows uncertainty ellipses, ¹0Σ¡1¹ = ®2
d, for home and foreign assets, ¹1 (horizon-
tal) and ¹2 (vertical), based on covariance matrices for three diﬀerent years. For instance,
the ﬁgure for Belgium shows that the value of b ®d for 1990 (dotted) is chosen to immunize
the investor against long-term variability of the proﬁt by about §10 percentage points in
both foreign and domestic assets. The immunity is less for years 1995 and 2000: about §8
percentage points. This level of robustness is quite large, considering that long-term proﬁts
are in the range of 2 or 3 percentage points. An investor who chooses b ®d values like those in
this ﬁgure is exceedingly, implausibly, risk averse. By comparison, consider the uncertainty
ellipses in ﬁg. 6. For Belgium, the demanded robustness, b ®d, is chosen to attain immu-
nity against long-term proﬁt variability of about §2:5 percentage points, a more plausible
expression of aversion to variability.
5 Empirical Study
5.1 Formulation and Results
We have applied info-gap robust-satisﬁcing decision theory to the analysis of ﬁnancial invest-
ments in 12 industrialized countries: Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy,
Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, UK and USA. We have calculated shadow costs
as explained in section 4, based on the optimal robustness function, b ®( b w(¼c); ¼c), deﬁned
in eqs.(5) and (6), with the ellipsoid-bound info-gap model for proﬁt-uncertainty in eq.(7).
Covariance matrices Σ for monthly data for each country are obtained from the MSCI [14]
data base for the continuously growing window from 1987 through 2000, as explained in
section 5.2. The observed homeshares are obtained from the FIBV [5] and the IMF [9] data
bases. These data for each country contain one home asset and one foreign asset, which are
constructed as a capitalization-weighted average of all foreign equity markets.
6Fig. 2 shows the CAPM annual shadow costs over time for 12 OECD countries, calculated
with the method of French and Poterba as explained in section 1 with ¸ = 3. These shadow
costs are all higher than plausible values of management fees.
Fig. 3 shows the demanded robustness, b ®d, over time for 12 OECD countries. Each value
of b ®d is chosen so that the resulting info-gap robust-satisﬁcing shadow cost, whose calculation
was explained in section 4.1, precisely equals the CAPM shadow cost for the same year and
country. Fig. 4 shows proﬁt-uncertainty ellipses, ¹0Σ¡1¹ = b ®2
d, for home and foreign assets,
¹1 (horizontal) and ¹2 (vertical), based on the b ®d values from ﬁg. 3. Ellipses for three years
are drawn: 1990, 1995 and 2000.
The results in ﬁgs. 3 and 4 are re-done in ﬁgs. 5 and 6, but now the demanded robustness
is chosen to achieve a shadow cost of precisely 0.01 for each country and each year.
The following conclusions can be drawn.
1. From ﬁg. 4, the robustness, b ®d, required to precisely reproduce the CAPM shadow
costs, typically entails aversion to long-term proﬁt ﬂuctuations in the neighborhood of:
(a) §5% in 3 countries: CAN, UK and USA.
(b) §6 to §8% in 6 countries: AUS, BEL, FRA, GER, NET and SWI.
(c) §20% or more in 3 countries: ITA, JAP and SWE.
2. From ﬁg. 6, the robustness, b ®d, required to produce annual shadow costs of 0.01,
typically entails aversion to long-term proﬁt ﬂuctuations in the neighborhood of:
(a) §1% in 3 countries: AUS, ITA and JAP
(b) §2% in 5 countries: BEL, CAN, FRA, GER and SWE.
(c) §3% in 3 countries: SWI, UK and USA.
(d) §6% in 1 country: NET.
3. From ﬁg. 3, the robustness, b ®d, required to precisely reproduce the CAPM shadow
costs, typically is fairly stable over time.
4. From ﬁg. 5, the robustness, b ®d, required to produce annual shadow costs of 0.01,
typically ﬂuctuates very substantially over time.
These observations are discussed in section 6.
5.2 Data Appendix
We consider two sets of countries: One consisting of the twelve countries for which we
compute the home bias, call it G12, and one larger set of 23 countries, call it G23, consisting
of the original 12 in addition to 11 more countries. For the 11 countries in G23 but not in
G12 we do not calculate home bias, but nevertheless they are included in the computation
of the index of the world stock market.
The data sources are as follows:
The international equity investment positions for the G12 countries Australia, Belgium,
Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, UK and USA
come from the IFS database (International Financial Statistics) from the International Mon-
etary Fund. The same is true for monthly CPI inﬂation1 and monthly exchange rates.
1Australia is the only country among the twelve that does not report monthly CPI numbers. The quarterly
CPI ﬁgures are therefore split evenly among the three months of each quarter. Since most of the variation of
real monthly stock returns in the other 11 countries comes from the movements in the index, not in the CPI,
this seems very reasonable.
7The end-of-year market capitalizations for the years 1990-2000 for G23 countries come
from the World Federation of Exchanges (FIBV). The 23 countries are the G12 countries
for which we compute home bias in addition to Brazil, Chile, Hong Kong, Indonesia, South
Korea, Spain, Mexico, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand and Turkey.
Monthly nominal returns for 1987:12 to 2000:12 in $US for the G23 countries come from
the MSCI database (www.msci.com).
For each of the G12 countries we compute domestic and foreign returns in home currency
and deﬂate them by domestic CPI. The foreign series is a capitalization-weighted average
of the other 22 countries.2 Precisely, the correlation matrices Σ needed for the info-gap
ellipsoids are computed for the G12 countries and 11 years using returns from 1987:12 to the
end of the corresponding year. For example, the Σ for Italy for the year 1995 is computed
using returns from 1987:12 up to 1995:12 for both Italian domestic returns and an average
of returns from the other 22 countries.
6 Discussion
The following conclusions can be drawn from the results of section 5.1, given the observed and
market capitalization portfolio weights, wo and wmc, and using the info-gap robust-satisﬁcing
decision model.
1. The CAPM shadow costs entail unreasonably high risk aversion for all countries through-
out the time interval examined.
2. Considering long-term returns of 4 to 5%, we think that robustness against proﬁt
variations of §3% constitutes plausible aspiration for immunity. For prediction of
annual shadow costs equal to 0.01, the robust-satisﬁcing model implies:
(a) Unreasonably low risk aversion for 3 countries: AUS, ITA and JAP (§1%.)
(b) Somewhat low risk aversion for 5 countries: BEL, CAN, FRA, GER and SWE
(§2%.)
(c) Plausible risk aversion for 4 countries: NET (§6%), SWI, UK and USA. (§3%.)
3. For the 3 countries, AUS, ITA and JAP, the §1% could be raised to §3% by raising
the shadow cost, but it would still be substantially lower than the CAPM shadow cost,
as witnessed by ﬁg. 4.
4. For the 5 countries, BEL, CAN, FRA, GER and SWE, the value of §2% could be
raised to §3% by modest increase of the shadow cost, perhaps to 0.015.
5. For NET, the value of §6% could be reduced to §3% by further reducing the shadow
cost substantially below 0.01.
The implication of these points is that the info-gap robust-satisﬁcing decision model
provides a plausible explanation of the observed portfolio weights, while the CAPM model
does not. We now proceed to develop some understanding of why this is.
2These G23 countries comprise between 95% and 97% of world market capitalization during the years
considered, so that we can conﬁdently assume the 23 countries taken together are a good approximization to
the world stock market.
86.1 Economic Intuition: Why Robust-satisﬁcing Works
6.1.1 Geometrical Introduction
To understand why the info-gap approach ﬁnds it easier — measured as the necessary shadow
cost — to account for home bias, it is useful to look at the mechanics of the model. The
discussion in this section is intuitive and geometrical. A rigorous derivation of the optimal
robustness appears in the appendix (section 8).
In the two-country version, a graphical representation combines all the variables of inter-
est: proﬁt aspiration ¼c, investment weights w, and robustness b ®. Fig. 7 does exactly that







(¹¡e ¹)0Σ¡1(¹¡e ¹)=b ®2
¹1
¹2
Figure 7. Determining the robustness b ®(w;¼c) (two-country case).
The dotted line lies at 45 degree to the axes. The solid line plots all (¹1; ¹2) points
for which ¹Tw = ¼c for given aspiration ¼c and given portfolio weights w. Consequently,
the solid line has slope ¡w1=w2 and crosses the point (¼c; ¼c) on the 45 degree line. If
w0e ¹ < ¼c then the robustness for this portfolio is zero (second line of eq.(9)). Thus consider
w and ¼c such that e ¹ is above the solid line. The robustness b ®(w;¼c) is given by the
® in U (®;¼c) for which the ellipse is tangent to the solid line. In that case the value of
argmin¹2U(b ®;¼c)
n
w0¹ : wT¹ ¸ ¼c
o
is given by the tangency point, or in other words where





» » :b w(¼c)
(¹¡e ¹)0Σ¡1(¹¡e ¹)=b ®2
¹1
¹2
Figure 8. Determining the robustness-optimizing portfolio b w (two-country case).
With ﬁg. 7 we have demonstrated the graphical determination of the robustness of given
portfolio weights w. To ﬁnd the robustness-optimizing portfolio weights b w(¼c) we can again
employ the graphical representation as shown in ﬁg. 8. Find the ® such that the ellipse
intersects the 45 degree line at (¼c;¼c). Then it is easy to see that b w(¼c) is the normalized
gradient of the ellipsoid function at (¼c;¼c). Changing w would rotate the straight line
around the point (¼c;¼c) which would cut into the ellipse and thus lower the robustness.
Hence, b w maximizes robustness.3
6.1.2 Shadow Costs: Algebraic Formulation
Equipped with these geometrical tools we can see how the info-gap robust-satisﬁcing decision
model can explain large home bias with lower shadow cost than in the CAPM approach. The
basic intuition is that the very steep part of the ellipse results in a nearly horizontal robust-
optimal investment vector b w as in ﬁg. 8, which corresponds to a high home share. We now
develop this intuition more quantitatively.
3This argument is valid if both elements of b w are positive. See section 8 for a general derivation of b ®(b w;¼c).
9The shadow cost from French and Poterba in a two-country example can be derived
graphically in a manner similar to the info-gap derivation in ﬁgs. 7 and 8. As explained
in section 1, the ﬁrst-order conditions for an extremum of the proﬁt, decremented with a
risk-aversion term, require that proﬁt, ¹, and investment weights, w, be related by:
¹ = ¸Σw (15)
Taking w, Σ, and C as given, consider the following optimization problem, which will underlie
our geometrical interpretation of the CAPM approach in section 6.1.3:
max
¹ w0¹ subject to ¹0Σ¡1¹ = C2 (16)





where ´ is the Lagrange multiplier on the constraint. Comparing eqs.(15) and (17) we see
that, in the CAPM approach, the implicit expected return vector ¹ satisﬁes the ﬁrst-order
conditions of the optimization in eq.(16) if ¸ = 1
2´: Using the constraint to solve for ´,







6.1.3 Shadow Costs: Geometric Formulation
The graphical representation of the CAPM shadow cost is portrayed in ﬁg. 9 with two ellipses
in (¹1;¹2) space, deﬁned by C2 = ¹0Σ¡1¹, one with Co =
p
¸wo0¹o and one with Cmc = p
¸wmc0¹mc. This is a critical diﬀerence between the CAPM and the info-gap approaches.
CAPM uses two ellipses of diﬀerent sizes, Co and Cmc. The info-gap approach uses 2 ellipses
of the same size, b ®d. As explained in section 4.2, b ®d is homologous to the CAPM risk-
aversion parameter ¸ which takes a single value. (We will discuss risk aversion again at the
end of this section.)
As indicated in ﬁg. 9, the implicit expected return vector, ¹o, consistent with the observed
portfolio weights, wo, is the tangency point to the Co ellipse of the hyperplane deﬁned by
wo. Similarly, the implicit market capitalization returns, ¹mc, is the tangency point of the
wmc hyperplane to the Cmc ellipse. The CAPM shadow cost is the sum of the coordinate
distances of the two tangency points as speciﬁed in eq.(2) and shown by the length of the
dotted lines in ﬁg. 9. Furthermore, if wo
1 À wmc
1 and Σ11 À Σ22 then eq.(19) can be used to
show that Co À Cmc. In that case the horizontal distance between the two points ˜ ¹o and
˜ ¹mc can be very large, contributing to a big shadow cost in the CAPM framework.
In info-gap approach, on the other hand, one begins with two ellipses, both of size b ®d,
one centered at e ¹o and one centered at e ¹mc, as in ﬁgs. 8 and 10. The centerpoints, e ¹o and
e ¹mc, are ﬁxed as described in eq.(12) of section 4.1. One ﬁnds that b ®d is substantially less
than Co and Cmc. That is, the info-gap ellipse is smaller than both of the CAPM ellipses.
The shadow cost is the sum of the coordinate distance between e ¹mc and e ¹o, as indicated by
the dotted lines in ﬁg. 10.
Let us summarize ﬁgs. 9 and 10. We have implemented the info-gap robust-satisﬁcing
theory in parallel to the CAPM theory. In particular, the CAPM risk-aversion parameter ¸ is
transposed into the info-gap demanded robustness b ®d. Each parameter, ¸ and b ®d, is single-
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Figure 9. Geometrical explanation of the CAPM
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Figure 10. Geometrical explanation of the info-gap shadow cost: the
sum of the two dotted lines.
the CAPM shadow cost which entails ellipsoidal sets of proﬁt vectors ¹ which are homologous
to the uncertainty sets of the ellipsoidal info-gap model. The shadow cost is less in the info-
gap than the CAPM method because both info-gap ellipses are of the same size, b ®d, which
is smaller than both of the CAPM ellipse-sizes, Co and Cmc.
So what does it mean that the CAPM uncertainty sets are greater than the info-gap
maximal-robustness set? Some insight is obtained by comparing the info-gap and CAPM
concepts of risk aversion. In the info-gap robust-satisﬁcing theory, b ®d is the robustness,
to proﬁt uncertainty, which the investor demands. A larger value of b ®d is chosen as the
investor’s risk-aversion increases. In the CAPM theory, ¸ is the risk-aversion weight in
the utility function. Like b ®d, a larger ¸ is chosen as the investor’s risk-aversion increases.
A robust-satisﬁcing investor, looking at the CAPM sets and thinking in robust-satisﬁcing
terms, would say: “What a large b ®d. How risk averse!” Conversely, a CAPM investor,
looking at the robust-satisﬁcing sets and thinking in CAPM terms, would say: “What a
small ¸. How risk-loving!” In fact, both assessments are wrong, because each is based
on a mistaken understanding of the other’s mental model. To the CAPM investor, the
info-gap robust-satisﬁcer looks risk-loving because the proﬁt is being satisﬁced rather than
maximized. To the robust-satisﬁcer, the CAPM investor looks risk averse because the proﬁt
is being maximized rather than satisﬁced.
Further understanding may be obtained by comparing the CAPM and the info-gap robust-
satisﬁcing decision models. The CAPM investor knows the returns vector, ¹. This would
allow the investor to choose the portfolio weights w so as to maximize the return, ¹0w.
However, this objective function, ¹0w, is decremented with its weighted portfolio-variance,
¸w0Σw, to express aversion to risky ﬂuctuation of the returns.
In contrast, the info-gap robust-satisﬁcing investor does not know the returns vector,
¹. Consequently the investor chooses the portfolio weights w so as to satisﬁce the return,
¹0w. Since satisﬁcing (unlike optimizing) generally has an inﬁnity of solutions, the robust-
satisﬁcing investor has an additional degree of freedom, which is used to maximize the
robustness.
116.2 Knightian Uncertainty, Bounded Rationality, and Info-gap Robust
Satisﬁcing
Our explanation of the home bias puzzle is based on using the info-gap robustness func-
tion to satisﬁce the proﬁt and to maximize the immunity to uncertainty. This decision
model provides one possible quantiﬁcation of Knightian uncertainty combined with Simon’s
conception of bounded rationality, as we will now explain. See also [3, chap. 12].
Frank Knight emphasized the fundamental distinction between probabilistically measur-
able uncertainty, which he called risk, and unmeasurable and uninsurable uncertainty, which
he referred to as “ ‘true’ uncertainty” [11, p.20; 12, p.120]. It is uncertainty, rather than risk,
which Knight saw as underlying the greatest challenges to economic agents and analysts [11,
pp.231–232]. Other writers have also noted the distinction between uncertainty and risk,
notably Samuelson [15, pp.503–504] and Arrow [1, p.19].
An info-gap model of uncertainty is a family of nested sets U(®; e u), ® ¸ 0. The elements
of these sets represent events (in our analysis: realizations of the proﬁt vector ¹). At any
given value of the horizon of uncertainty, ®, the set U(®; e u) speciﬁes a range of possible
variation of the events. Since the horizon of uncertainty is unknown and unbounded, there
is no worst case. Since no measure functions of probability (or plausibility, or belief, etc.)
are speciﬁed by an info-gap model, the analyst cannot calculate statistical expectations and
cannot probabilistically insure against the unknown contingencies identiﬁed in the info-gap
model.
An info-gap model of uncertainty is a more extreme departure from probabilistic tradition
than proposed by Gilboa and Schmeidler [8] and developed by Epstein and Wang [4] and
others, who replace a single prior probability distribution with a set of distributions. In our
formulation, preferences are generated without any distribution functions at all.
Knight never provided a quantiﬁcation of his conception of ‘true uncertainty’, and such
a quantiﬁcation may not be unique. It would seem, however, that the highly unstructured
and minimalistic quantiﬁcation of uncertainty entailed in an info-gap model corresponds
reasonably well to Knight’s conception of uncertainty.
‘Satisﬁcing’ is the satisfaction of minimal requirements or speciﬁcations: making the
performance good enough, as distinct from optimizing the performance. Herbert Simon has
pointed out that ‘comparative advantage’, whether in biological or economic survival, is a
satisﬁcing strategy (don’t optimize, just beat the competition) [18, p.69]. Simon recognized
the role of satisﬁcing as a means for dealing with the “limitations upon the capacities and
complexity of the organism, and [for] taking account of the fact that the environments to
which it must adapt possess properties that permit further simplication [sic] of its choice
mechanisms.” [17, p.129]. Simon refers to this combination of organismic and environmental
limitations as ‘bounded rationality’ [19].
The info-gap robustness function, b ®(w;¼c) in eq.(5), evaluates the immunity, of investment
w, to the Knightian uncertainty of an info-gap model, while attempting to satisﬁce the proﬁt
at the level ¼c. The robustness function generates preferences on the investment alternatives
w. While proﬁt is satisﬁced rather than maximized, what is maximized, resulting in the
robust-optimal investment b w(¼c) in eq.(6), is the immunity to uncertainty.
Decision makers can respond in many ways to Knightian uncertainty and to bounded
rationality. One possible response is to employ the info-gap robustness function. The epis-
temic requirements are no greater than those needed for selecting an info-gap model, which
constitutes a quantiﬁcation of Knightian uncertainty. The robustness function explicitly sat-
isﬁces rather than optimizes the proﬁt. Our study of the home bias phenomenon suggests
that robustness optimization may not exceed the capability of “boundedly rational” decision
makers.
127 Appendix: Partial Geometric Derivation of Robust-optimal
Investment
In this section we outline a geometrical derivation of the investment vector b w(¼c) which
maximizes the robustness for the ellipsoid-bound info-gap model. We consider the general
N-country case, so w and ¹ are N-vectors, and w satisﬁes w01 = 1 where 1 is the N-
vector whose elements are all ones. Let H(w;¼c) denote the hyperplane in ¹-space deﬁned
by w0¹ = ¼c. We ﬁrst derive the robustness function, b ®(w;¼c), for ﬁxed portfolio w and
aspiration ¼c. We then derive the robustness-maximizing portfolio, b w(¼c), given aspiration
¼c. We then derive the aspiration and portfolio as functions of the robustness, ¼c(b ®) and
b w(b ®).
Robustness function b ®(w;¼c). Examination of eq.(5) shows that, if the anticipated
proﬁt vector, e ¹, does not yield more than the aspired proﬁt, w0e ¹ · ¼c, then the robustness
vanishes: b ®(w;¼c) = 0. In other words, the robustness is positive if and only if e ¹ is above
the hyperplane H(w;¼c).
So, for e ¹ above H(w;¼c), ﬁnd the value of ® at which the ellipsoid in ¹-space, ®2 =
(¹ ¡ e ¹)
0 Σ¡1 (¹ ¡ e ¹), is tangent to H(w;¼c). (See ﬁg. 7 for a 2-dimensional illustration.)
The geometric realization of the deﬁnition of the robustness in eq.(5) is that this value of ®
is the robustness. At this point of tangency between the hyperplane and the ellipsoid, the
outward normal of the ellipsoid is 2Σ¡1 (¹ ¡ e ¹), while the normal to the hyperplane is w.
That is:
cw = 2Σ¡1 (¹ ¡ e ¹) (20)
where c is a non-zero constant which guarantees that this ¹ lies on the boundary of the
ellipsoid, resulting in:





Since w0¹ = ¼c for this ¹ which lies on the hyperplane H(w;¼c), this value of ® (which is
the robustness), becomes the expression in eq.(9).
Robustness-maximizing portfolio b w(¼c). The central fact is that the hyperplane
H(w;¼c) contains the point ¹ = ¼c1 for any choice of the portfolio w. The next point is
that the ellipsoid ®2 = (¹ ¡ e ¹)
0 Σ¡1 (¹ ¡ e ¹) is tangent to H(w;¼c) when ® equals b ®(w;¼c),
as we have explained in connection with eqs.(20) and (21). It results that the greatest
possible robustness, for aspiration ¼c, is the value of ® for which the ellipsoid is tangent to
the hyperplane at the point ¹ = ¼c1 (see ﬁg. 8 for a 2-dimensional illustration).
When the ellipsoid is tangent to H(w;¼c), the normal to the ellipsoid is proportional to
w. When this occurs at ¹ = ¼c1, the value of w, which is the portfolio which maximizes the
robustness, is found to be:
b w(¼c) =
1
10Σ¡1 (¼c1 ¡ e ¹)
Σ¡1 (¼c1 ¡ e ¹) (22)
Substituting this into eq.(9) results in the maximal robustness for aspiration ¼c:4
b ®( b w(¼c); ¼c) =
q
(¼c1 ¡ e ¹)
0 Σ¡1 (¼c1 ¡ e ¹) (23)
8 Appendix: Algebraic Derivation of Robust-optimal
Investment
In this section we outline the derivation of the investment vector b w(¼c) which maximizes the
robustness for the ellipsoid-bound info-gap model, eq.(9). It is convenient to consider two
4Something is wrong. Eq.(22) results in a robustness which is the negative of eq.(23).
13cases.
1. e ¹ = m01, where m0 is a scalar.
2. e ¹ 6= m01, where m0 is a scalar. We proceed in two steps:
(a) Find w to minimize w0Σw subject to w01 = 1 (budget constraint; 1 is an N-vector
of ones) and w0e ¹ = · where · is a constant no less than ¼c. Denote the result
b w(·).
(b) Find · to maximize b ®( b w(·);¼c) in eq.(9).
We ﬁrst consider case 1. e ¹ = m01 and, by the budget constraint, w01 = 1, so
w0e ¹ = m0. So, from eq.(9), the robustness is zero unless m0 ¸ ¼c. Consequently, w
maximizes the robustness if w is chosen as a solution of the following optimization problem:
minw0Σw subject to w01 = 1 (24)
Lagrange optimzation immediately results in the following robust-optimal investment vector





b ®( b w;¼c) = (m0 ¡ ¼c)
p
10Σ¡11 (26)
We note that the robust-optimal investment vector, b w, is independent of the anticipated
proﬁt vector e ¹. The maximal robustness, b ®( b w;¼c) varies aﬃnely with the magnitude, m0,
of the anticipated proﬁt vector.
We now consider case 2, for which e ¹ 6= m01, where m0 is a scalar.
Step 2a. We use Lagrange optimization to solve the following problem, for any value of
· ¸ ¼c:




hf ¡ g2Σ¡1 [(f e ¹ ¡ g1)· + h1 ¡ ge ¹] (28)
where:
f = 10Σ¡11; g = e ¹0Σ¡11; h = e ¹0Σ¡1e ¹ (29)





e ¹0Σ¡1(e ¹10 ¡ 1e ¹0)Σ¡11
Ξ
z }| { h
Σ¡1(e ¹10 ¡ 1e ¹0)Σ¡1
i
(1· ¡ e ¹) (30)
which deﬁnes the scalar µ and the matrix Ξ, neither of which depends upon ·.
Step 2b. From eqs.(9) and (30), and since b w0(·)e ¹ = · and · ¸ ¼c, we express the
robustness as a function of ·:




(1· ¡ e ¹)0Ω(1· ¡ e ¹)
(31)
where we have deﬁned Ω = Ξ0ΣΞ.
14b ®( b w(·);¼c) and b ®2( b w(·);¼c) reach extrema at the same values of ·. Analysis of b ®2( b w(·);¼c)
reveals that its only extremum occurs at:
b · =
(¼c1 ¡ e ¹)0Ωe ¹
(¼c1 ¡ e ¹)0Ω1
(32)
provided that this is no less than ¼c; otherwise the extremum occurs at · = 1.
From eq.(31) we see that:
b ®( b w(· = ¼c);¼c) = 0; and lim
·!1
b ®( b w(·);¼c) > 0 (33)
Hence the extremum of b ®( b w(·);¼c), obtained with b · of eq.(32), must be a maximum.
In summary of case 2: the robust-optimal investment vector, b w(b ·), is obtained by com-
bining eqs.(30) and (32). The maximal robustness, b ®( b w(b ·); ¼c), is obtained by combining
eqs.(31) and (32). We note that b · varies nonlinearly with the magnitude of the anticipated
proﬁt vector e ¹. Consequently both the optimal investment, b w(b ·), and the maximal robust-
ness, b ®( b w(b ·); ¼c), vary as e ¹ changes. This is unlike case 1, for which the optimal investment
is independent of e ¹ and the maximal robustness varies aﬃnely with the magnitude of e ¹.
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Figure Captions
1. Determining the centerpoint, e ¹, given portfolio weights w (two-country case).
2. CAPM annual shadow costs versus year.
3. Demanded robustness, b ®d, versus year. Shadow cost at each point equals the corre-
sponding CAPM value.
4. Proﬁt-uncertainty ellipses, ¹2 (vertical) vs. ¹1 (horizontal). Shadow cost at each point
equals the corresponding CAPM value. Year 1990: dotted; 1995: dashed; 2000: solid.
5. Demanded robustness, b ®d, versus year. Shadow cost at each point is 0.01 (annual).
6. Proﬁt-uncertainty ellipses, ¹2 (vertical) vs. ¹1 (horizontal). Shadow cost at each point
is 0.01 (annual). Year 1990: dotted; 1995: dashed; 2000: solid.
7. Determining the robustness b ®(w;¼c) (two-country case).
8. Determining the robustness-optimizing portfolio b w (two-country case).
9. Geometrical explanation of the CAPM shadow cost: the sum of the two dotted lines.
10. Geometrical explanation of the info-gap shadow cost: the sum of the two dotted lines.
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